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Editorials

DNR—A God-Like Decision

I

n his book Come, Let Us Play God Augenstein states,
"There are times when we have to make God-like decisions"
(1). Not to resuscitate a patient who is regarded as terminally and
ineversibly i l l , for whom resuscitation is considered futile,
might be classified as a decision requiring divine qualifications.
However God-lUce it may be, a decision often needs to be made
on whether or not to "code" a patient, hoping to write an order
that is consistent with the highest tradition of good medical practice and in the best interests of the patient, the family, and
society.
The experience of Redmond and Ahmad (2) recounted in this
issue illustrates the dilemma facing physicians who care for the
critically i l l . Having suffered a pontine stroke, this patient
rapidly developed the profound neurologic disturbances that
characterize patients whose reported course has been uniformly
fatal. The present patient, however, responded to supportive
measures in the intensive care unit and was ultimately restored to
independent living. Although the possibility of discontinuing
resuscitative efforts was never a consideration in this case, the
patient's course does demonstrate that ominous physical
deterioration may be unexpectedly reversed.
Writing on medical ethics, Haring stated: "An expensive
tteatment for a life already doomed may constitute a grave injustice toward the members of the patient's family. Often the
heavyfinancialburden is incuned by the family solely through
fear for their reputation. The attending physician would be acting inesponsibly were he or she to yield to family pressures in
such a case" (3). Pius XII long ago spoke in an approving tone
about families who bring pressure to bear upon the attending
physician "to remove the respirators so as to allow the patient,
already dead, to depart in peace" (4). Medical progress must not
deny a person his ethical right to die in human dignity (5).
A Special Biomedical Ethics Committee for the American
Hospital Association considers three essentials to making a decision not to resuscitate (DNR). They are: 1) maximum medical
data; 2) preferences of the patient, interpreted if necessary by
the patient's family or other surrogate; and 3) consultation
among physicians, other attending health care professionals,
and family members. The Committee insisted that a DNR order
should never be written without the knowledge of the competent
patient or the family or sunogate of the patient (6).
From a theological perspective, physicians and ethicists may
have a different emphasis in their approach to the dying, but
there need not be any radical disagreement between them, if
three tmths are clearly understood:
1. Physicians and moralists often use the terms "ordinary
means" and "extraordinary means" with different connotations.
2. While the physician has the expertness and the right to
make decisions conceming the usefulness or medical effects of
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given therapeutic measures, the patient (and/or the family of the
patient) has the right to determine whether those measures are
ordinary or extraordinary from an ethical point of view.
3. If the measures are determined to be ordinary, then they
must be employed; if exttaordinary, they may be employed. The
decision should be made by the patient (and/or the family) in
consultation with the physician. Whatever the decision, ordinary care should continue (7).
When technology is used to save lives, no one questions its
benefits. But when it is used to prolong a person's dying and to
add to the burden faced by the individual, the family, society,
and the medical staff as well, there is a growing consensus
among religious leaders that withholding "last-gasp" measures
is justified. The following statements in support of such a position are from seven major religious denominations:
We have a moral obligation to protect life. When our
resources are inadequate to secure the continuance of life,
we need to allow the patient to proceed to the next stage of
life that begins with death (Lutheran Church).
When inevitable death is imminent in spite of the
means used, it is permitted in conscience to take the decision to refuse forms of treatment that would only secure a
precarious and burdensome prolongation of life (Pope
John Paul II).
The removal of pain and consciousness by the means of
dmgs, when medical reasons suggest it, is permitted by
religion and morality to both doctor and patient, even if
the use of drugs will shorten life (Pope Pius Xll).
The conclusion from the spirit of Jewish law is that
while you may not do anything to hasten death, you may,
under special circumstances of suffering and helplessness, allow death to come (Central Conference of
American Rabbis),
We assert the right of every person to die in dignity
without efforts to prolong terminal illnesses merely because the technology is available to do so (United Methodist Church).
When illness takes away those abilities we associate
with full personhood, we may feel that the mere continuance of the body by machine or dmgs is a violation of their
person . . . We do not believe simply the continuance of
mere physical existence is either morally defensive or socially desirable or is God's will (United Chiu-ch of Christ).
We believe that human life is a gift that is meaningful
only as long as the receiver is able to function as a person
(American Friends Service Committee).
We support euthanasia (defined as the refusal to take
extraordinary means to preserve life) when one has been
reduced to a vegetative existence or is dying of an incurable disease with unrelieved suffering (Presbytery of New
York City).
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Whatever guidelines are adopted on DNR today, they will
need review tomonow. Concepts change with new insights and
advances in medical technology. What is considered exttaordinary today may be ordinary tomonow. As long as we are alert
and open to modification and change in maintaining high standards of medical practice, we are on therightttack.
Guidelines for issuing the DNR order as well as those for the
determination of death have been formulated by a specially convened committee of Henry Ford Hospital. After broad consid-

eration and modification, the recommendations have been
adopted as policy by the Board of Governors. Application of
these guidelines can help physicians make thett God-like decision, but human beings can never escape the possibility of
human enor.

References

Acta Apostolicae Sedis I957;49:I029.
5. Boone WJ. Religion and medicine. J Med Soc NJ 1968;65:637.
6. Hoffman P. Values in conflict; resolving ethical issues in hospital care.
A report of the Special Committee on Biomedical Ethics. American Hospital
Association I985;January:2I.
7. O'Rourke K, Ashley B. Health care ethics, a theological analysis. St
Louis: The Catholic Hospital Association, 1978:387.

1. Augenstein LG. Come let us play God. New York, London: Harper and
Rowe, 1969:12.
2. Redmond JMT, Ahmad BK. Recovery following acute pontine hemorrhage. Henry Ford Hosp Med J 1986;34:6-10,
3. Haring B. Medical ethics, Rome: Fides Publishers, Inc, 1972:141.
4. Pius XII. Discourse to doctors. November 24, 1975 (communication).

74 Henry Ford Hosp Med J—Vol 34, No 1, 1986

Dwain Gade, MA
Lutheran Chaplain
Henry Ford Hospital

Editorial—Gade

